 | Forum
Reply | Accounts are out
at 13:44 9 Feb 2020
If you think me capable of refraining from taking the piss about that, you see me as more saintly than I actually am  |
| Forum
Reply | Accounts are out
at 13:25 9 Feb 2020
OT -- Can't believe the shareholder legal action seemingly hasn't progressed a nanometre since I last looked in.
Incredible, Jeff. |
| Forum
Reply | Accounts are out
at 13:23 9 Feb 2020
As per accounts.
Must be Daniel James I didn't have in. |
| Forum
Reply | Accounts are out
at 13:08 9 Feb 2020
. . the figures mentioned imply a profit on player sales of north of £30 million and what I don't get is how to reach that number.
I am only getting to around a third of that total, but I must be missing some large profits on players sold during the summer or last January?? |
| Forum
Reply | Accounts are out
at 12:56 9 Feb 2020
. . .oops, nope, on second thought strike my comments on the net debt forecast, looks like I hadn't updated that in my model |
| Forum
Reply | Accounts are out
at 12:47 9 Feb 2020
You think the financial position is better than you expected? Unfortunately that's because you don't have a fcuking clue what you're talking about.
But you are quite clearly not alone in that situation, so my thoughts are as follows:
The sparse comments imply an operating loss of £34.7 million versus my old expectation of a loss of £31m. However, that used a slightly larger player ammortation figure, so adjusting for that the results are largely in line with my - infinitely superior - expectations.
But the far more interesting aspect of what is going on involves the balance sheet. I have forecast net debt of around £50 million, and if you assume McBurnie's fee is paid in full you get to £32m.
Haven't been paying attention to player movements, but it doesn't look like there has been much investment which is clearly not sustainable so there must be material outflows to come.
Time is growing short to secure promotion and with the - in my view - greatest asset Potter gone, the financial position remains seriously risky. |
| Forum
Reply | Swansea financial sweepstake
at 13:03 29 Apr 2019
Well the results are in, ladies and germs:
Assets came in around £18 million lower than expected due substantially to a £15m 'impairment charge', which translates to duff players bought for too much money, as well as a slightly larger ordinary amortisation charge.
The financing side of that was accounted for by a slightly bigger net loss than anticipated (~£2m), with the balance due to lower than anticipated indebtedness.
Reasons for the better than expected cash-flow/lower debt appear to be better revenue, likely no investment in the squad whatsoever on contract renewals outside of the headline signings, and lower wage costs.
However, on the final point I am getting an unexplained difference of around £6m when reconciling cash-flow to balance sheet movements. I strongly suspect that is a sleight of hand involving the Sanches loan fee, that has probably been capitalised and then written off as part of the dufff player impairment charge. Hard to argue with that objectively! |
| Forum
Reply | Are The Trust endorsing this 1000+ protsest...
at 12:13 10 Feb 2019
You make an appeal for support to this board that then falls flat on its face.
But you don't give a fcuk and carry on regardless, trashing the discussion that was building.
Show some fcukign respect or i will use my vast influence over Phil to lobby him to have you kicked out as well. |
| Forum
Reply | Are The Trust endorsing this 1000+ protsest...
at 12:03 10 Feb 2019
No.
The will of the vast majority here for reasons totally unrelated to censorship.
And if you can't accept and play according to the rules of the community you should be next in line.
Now you've had your say on this and garnered no support. So kindly shut
the fcuk up. |
| Forum
Reply | Swans accounts on company house
at 08:07 8 Feb 2019
The parachute payment becomes an asset when it is due in the following season; in a new accounting period.
But it is intended to aid the transition in the costs and wage structure of a relegated team from revenues of +£100 million in TV money to no more than perhaps £10 million in the Championship.
importantly it can not be used twice, both to do that and also to pay off the old debts.
Hence the need for a firesale of players.
And this is where it becomes problematic in the extreme having used that debt to buy players of the calibre of Bony at £12 million, Clucas at £16m, A Ayew at £22m, Mesa at £12m . Sanches loan fee etc.
Not good, and at the same time the club has been unable to achieve anywhere near hoped for prices on some of the better player stock like Mawson. |
| Forum
Reply | Swans accounts on company house
at 22:31 7 Feb 2019
This is really very, very simple.
It can only be cognitive dissonance left over from the days of the mantra of the well run club that is preventing people from grasping this infant school bit of maths. |
| Forum
Reply | Swans accounts on company house
at 22:29 7 Feb 2019
In finance assets are what you own, and liabilities what you owe. These are shown on the balaace sheet.
End 2017 there were short term assets of £32 million + £8m of relevant longer term assets.
There were short term liabilities of £97million plus another £10 million of relevant longer term liabilities.
(32+8)-(97+10)=black hole at the end of 2017=net amount of money that the club owed. |
| Forum
Reply | The Countdown begins.
at 17:20 6 Feb 2019
Interesting background:
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Brexiters never had a real exit plan. No wonder they avoided the issue
The harsh truth about leaving the EU was obvious five years ago. But the right covered it up
By Nick Cohen
Guardian, Sat 26 Jan 2019 18.30 GMT
The secret history of modern Britain is made in obscure corners between men and women taken seriously by no one but themselves. A good time to begin it would be in the winter of 2013/14 when the Institute of Economic Affairs, a rightist outfit that won’t reveal where its money comes from, offered a €100,000 prize to whoever could devise a means of leaving the European Union.
The reason why politicians are now stumbling towards disaster like prisoners marching to the scaffold ought to have been clear from that moment. Obviously, Britain can leave the EU, but only if it is willing to pay an extortionate price. Yet first the institute’s judges, led by Nigel Lawson and Gisela Stuart, then the Leave campaigns of Boris Johnson, Nigel Farage and Dominic Cummings and, finally, Theresa May and Jeremy Corbyn, who even now cannot speak plainly, have refused to acknowledge the harsh truth.
As if to anticipate their failings, the winning entry came from a minor functionary in the British embassy in Manila by the name of Iain Mansfield. He brushed away the difficulties of leaving the EU and offered us our first helping of unicorn cake. Britain, he declared, could enjoy the free movement of capital and goods in the single market, he announced, but stop the free movement of labour.
His triumph marked an ominous moment. Until 2013, even rightwing politicians accepted that they could not have the best of all possible worlds. Britain was tied into an integrated European economy. No government could wrench it away in a couple of years. Britain would have to stay in the customs union, as Liam Fox said in 2012. The most significant thinker in the Brexit movement went further. Richard North, the advocate of “Flexcit”, warned that, as a sudden departure would wreck people’s lives, Britain would have to be like Norway and stay in the single market, “at least in the medium term”, as it dedicated many years, maybe more than a decade, to flexible negotiations about a future arrangement.
Rationally, a flexible approach made sense. But by the winter of 2013 the market for rational politics was faltering. North described how Lawson and his fellow judges excluded from the shortlist entries that said the only way to leave the EU was to follow the Norwegian example. Until that point, he had had regular meetings with Arron Banks, Owen Patterson and Cummings. “But something then happened — I don’t know what. Cummings went dark on me and I was ‘no platformed’.”
Electorally, allowing millions to believe that the impossible was possible was perfect post-rational politics
You don’t need to be a detective to work out why the darkness fell. How could the Brexit campaign inspire nationalist passions, how could Fox, Lawson, Johnson, Farage and Banks inspire even themselves, if they were to say that the only rational way to leave the EU was to carry on paying money, accepting freedom of movement and receiving laws that Britain had no say in making, while an orderly retreat was organised? Who would vote for that? What would be the point of leaving at all?
Better to take the road to Narnia and promise everything while committing to nothing. After the prize was awarded to a political fantasy, Cummings gave fair warning of what was coming next. Writing in 2015, he admitted that the campaign would offer no exit plan: hard Brexit, soft Brexit or any Brexit in between. “There is much to be gained from swerving the whole issue,” he explained. Opponents of the EU “have been divided for years”. In any case, “the sheer complexity of leaving would involve endless questions of detail that cannot be answered”.
An honourable man, and an honourable political movement, would have found these excellent reasons to think again. Not Cummings and not the Brexit movement. Intellectually, their Brexit was an empty idea. But electorally, allowing millions to believe that the impossible was possible was perfect post-rational politics. As Roland Smith of the Adam Smith Institute, another rightwing thinktank, said last week, the “dirty secret” of the Leave campaign was that it “didn’t have a well-formed idea of how to leave the EU or indeed whether any alternative was really palatable”.
It is easy to portray Cummings, Johnson and Farage as grand villains. Indeed, if we crash out with no deal, we will be hard pressed to find so much misery brought to so many by so few. But the Cameron government, every MP who voted for the referendum, the supposedly ferocious interviewers at the BBC and hard-nosed journalists in the press let them get away with it. None insisted that the voters be told what form of Brexit they were voting for.
As a point of contrast, consider that in 2018 Ireland discussed removing its constitutional ban on abortion. There was an exhaustive debate at a citizens’ assembly on the proposed measures and the government published a policy paper outlining in what circumstances abortion would be legal if the reform were approved in a referendum, so that no one could argue about the result. As a matter of deliberate policy by Brexit’s supporters, and as a consequence of unforgivable negligence by politicians and journalists, Britain’s referendum offered no such clarity.
I hope you can now see the consequences of obscure arguments in political backwaters. Supporters of a “people’s vote” are met with the superficially plausible objection: “But we’ve already had a referendum.” Supporters of May’s deal and the “Norway option” face the objection that the Leave campaign never told them that we would have to accept EU rules once we left. Finally, for the supporters of a hard Brexit and the millions who risk their futures by believing them, crashing out and crying “to hell with it” are the logical consequences of the illogical retreat from reason they began in 2013.
For good or ill, you can guarantee that the arguments that affect us most are the ones that never make it on to evening news. In the case of Brexit Britain, it’s all ill.
Brexiters never had a real exit plan. No wonder they avoided the issue
The harsh truth about leaving the EU was obvious five years ago. But the right covered it up
By Nick Cohen
Guardian, Sat 26 Jan 2019 18.30 GMT
The secret history of modern Britain is made in obscure corners between men and women taken seriously by no one but themselves. A good time to begin it would be in the winter of 2013/14 when the Institute of Economic Affairs, a rightist outfit that won’t reveal where its money comes from, offered a €100,000 prize to whoever could devise a means of leaving the European Union.
The reason why politicians are now stumbling towards disaster like prisoners marching to the scaffold ought to have been clear from that moment. Obviously, Britain can leave the EU, but only if it is willing to pay an extortionate price. Yet first the institute’s judges, led by Nigel Lawson and Gisela Stuart, then the Leave campaigns of Boris Johnson, Nigel Farage and Dominic Cummings and, finally, Theresa May and Jeremy Corbyn, who even now cannot speak plainly, have refused to acknowledge the harsh truth.
As if to anticipate their failings, the winning entry came from a minor functionary in the British embassy in Manila by the name of Iain Mansfield. He brushed away the difficulties of leaving the EU and offered us our first helping of unicorn cake. Britain, he declared, could enjoy the free movement of capital and goods in the single market, he announced, but stop the free movement of labour.
His triumph marked an ominous moment. Until 2013, even rightwing politicians accepted that they could not have the best of all possible worlds. Britain was tied into an integrated European economy. No government could wrench it away in a couple of years. Britain would have to stay in the customs union, as Liam Fox said in 2012. The most significant thinker in the Brexit movement went further. Richard North, the advocate of “Flexcit”, warned that, as a sudden departure would wreck people’s lives, Britain would have to be like Norway and stay in the single market, “at least in the medium term”, as it dedicated many years, maybe more than a decade, to flexible negotiations about a future arrangement.
Rationally, a flexible approach made sense. But by the winter of 2013 the market for rational politics was faltering. North described how Lawson and his fellow judges excluded from the shortlist entries that said the only way to leave the EU was to follow the Norwegian example. Until that point, he had had regular meetings with Arron Banks, Owen Patterson and Cummings. “But something then happened — I don’t know what. Cummings went dark on me and I was ‘no platformed’.”
Electorally, allowing millions to believe that the impossible was possible was perfect post-rational politics
You don’t need to be a detective to work out why the darkness fell. How could the Brexit campaign inspire nationalist passions, how could Fox, Lawson, Johnson, Farage and Banks inspire even themselves, if they were to say that the only rational way to leave the EU was to carry on paying money, accepting freedom of movement and receiving laws that Britain had no say in making, while an orderly retreat was organised? Who would vote for that? What would be the point of leaving at all?
Better to take the road to Narnia and promise everything while committing to nothing. After the prize was awarded to a political fantasy, Cummings gave fair warning of what was coming next. Writing in 2015, he admitted that the campaign would offer no exit plan: hard Brexit, soft Brexit or any Brexit in between. “There is much to be gained from swerving the whole issue,” he explained. Opponents of the EU “have been divided for years”. In any case, “the sheer complexity of leaving would involve endless questions of detail that cannot be answered”.
An honourable man, and an honourable political movement, would have found these excellent reasons to think again. Not Cummings and not the Brexit movement. Intellectually, their Brexit was an empty idea. But electorally, allowing millions to believe that the impossible was possible was perfect post-rational politics. As Roland Smith of the Adam Smith Institute, another rightwing thinktank, said last week, the “dirty secret” of the Leave campaign was that it “didn’t have a well-formed idea of how to leave the EU or indeed whether any alternative was really palatable”.
It is easy to portray Cummings, Johnson and Farage as grand villains. Indeed, if we crash out with no deal, we will be hard pressed to find so much misery brought to so many by so few. But the Cameron government, every MP who voted for the referendum, the supposedly ferocious interviewers at the BBC and hard-nosed journalists in the press let them get away with it. None insisted that the voters be told what form of Brexit they were voting for.
As a point of contrast, consider that in 2018 Ireland discussed removing its constitutional ban on abortion. There was an exhaustive debate at a citizens’ assembly on the proposed measures and the government published a policy paper outlining in what circumstances abortion would be legal if the reform were approved in a referendum, so that no one could argue about the result. As a matter of deliberate policy by Brexit’s supporters, and as a consequence of unforgivable negligence by politicians and journalists, Britain’s referendum offered no such clarity.
I hope you can now see the consequences of obscure arguments in political backwaters. Supporters of a “people’s vote” are met with the superficially plausible objection: “But we’ve already had a referendum.” Supporters of May’s deal and the “Norway option” face the objection that the Leave campaign never told them that we would have to accept EU rules once we left. Finally, for the supporters of a hard Brexit and the millions who risk their futures by believing them, crashing out and crying “to hell with it” are the logical consequences of the illogical retreat from reason they began in 2013.
For good or ill, you can guarantee that the arguments that affect us most are the ones that never make it on to evening news. In the case of Brexit Britain, it’s all ill.
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/jan/26/brexiters-never-had-a-real |
| | Shaky
|
Site Scores| Forum Votes: | 343 | | Comment Votes: | 0 | | Prediction League: | 0 | | TOTAL: | 343 |
|
By continuing to use the site, you agree to our use of cookies and to abide by our Terms and Conditions.