There have been huge changes in style and shape from Neil Critchley to Gareth Ainsworth, but results have remained pretty constant and QPR have conceded 13 goals in his five matches in charge — Dan Lambert analyses where it’s still going wrong.
Form and results haven’t changed all that much since Gareth Ainsworth came in: four defeats and a win against Watford. Across those, the big issue has been defensively with the team conceding 13 goals in five games. What has changed is the style, the system and most importantly the structures both in and out of possession. In this piece I’ll be detailing what has gone wrong structurally in these games so far and looking at the areas we can improve.
The one big change from Critchley to Ainsworth instantly was the pressing structure. Under Critchley we used a hybrid system (went man to man in high areas and zonal in deeper areas) whereas with Ainsworth we use a rigid man to man structure. It has its benefits like all systems — for instance, it can be good at stifling teams when building from deep by man marking key individuals - but because you leave the risk of going 1v1 across the board it can have a knock on effect further along the pitch if not executed correctly. Also, in deeper areas teams can manipulate the structure through movement, rotations and pinning (I’ll explain with examples shortly).
In the Blackburn game, there were clear teething problems in the structure and in our athletic abilities to maintain a man to man press- which I’ll highlight below. It’s worth noting Blackburn had a spare man at CB, with Chris Martin dealing with both of them, and they used that spare man very well.
Martin is man to man with Carter (RCB) whilst Iroegbunam jumps to Hyam (LCB). Because we went man to man against both CBs it led to Buckley being the free man as the deepest midfielder. Too many times in this game we allowed the far side switch to Dolan 1v1 against Kakay.
Example of Dolan 1v1 off a quick switch.
As said earlier, Blackburn used the spare man very well against the press when either the pivot or one of the CBs were free to receive.
Hyam plays the ball into Buckley, this time under direct pressure from Iroegbunam, but Carter is free and able to receive.
Simple third man combination to find the spare man. Carter can drive into space to find the next progressive pass.
Here’s a longer example using video, highlighting the man to man press having a knock on effect further down the pitch when Blackburn used the spare man efficiently.
Two stark examples there of Blackburn using the spare man against our man to man press. It’s worth noting this was our first game under Ainsworth so there was always room for improvement - the man to man press improved at Watford as I’ll show but there weren’t huge examples to show in our last two games against Blackpool and Birmingham as neither team really build-up in deep areas at all, instead turning the ball over to their strikers.
Man to man press everywhere bar Cathcart who is the spare man. Keinan Davis drops deep to receive away from Dickie with a big enough gap to question his positioning.
Davis receives back to goal, Dickie pressures and forces a turnover in a good area to transition.
We’ve seen mixed performances out of possession, especially our pressing. The issue I have short to mid-term with using a man-to-man press is with the personnel of the squad. Individual errors are a real issue across the board (not just the defence) so can you really trust this squad with winning their individual 1v1 duels on a consistent basis?
Another structural issue is the distances between players in an out of possession shape. Most managers want their teams to be compact between one another to prevent spaces in central areas.
In the Inside Training release by the QPR media team, Ainsworth highlights a good example of this…
Watch 5:14-5:20 where it shows Ainsworth nailing down compactness between the back four and tighter distances.
In a man to man system, it becomes harder as teams will try to pull you away but we have seen Ainsworth execute this well at Wycombe and how defensively compact they were, given time of course.
Two of the goals vs Blackburn highlighted our issue with distances either via enforced errors or the opposition causing them.
Here’s the third Blackburn goal. We lose the 2v1 here (somehow). The distance between Dunne and Paal is very big, whilst Johansen is marking the short option.
Lose the 2v1 out wide. Stef unable to get to the ball quick enough. Gap between Rankin-Costello and Dunne means he drive into the box. Both Gallagher and Dolan (far left of shot) make an initial front post run.
Dunne doesn’t stay in line with the Rankin Costello, who finds the avenue to play the ball across goal. Dolan’s run drags Kakay out to create the back post space and Gallagher’s double movement allows him to be found for a back post tap in.
Another example from the game, this time where the structure is chaotic after we lose possession, leaving Blackburn the opportunity to transition with spaces between the shape.
Distances between midfield and CBs once the ball is bypassed are big. Allows Gallagher to receive between the lines amongst finding Szmodics. Distances between Dickie and Kakay are big enough for Blackburn to hit the channels.
Third man combination allows Szmodics to find Dolan through on goal behind the defence. Quick move exploits the gaps between our structure when in defensive transition.
Another example of how Blackburn exploited the CB-FB distances by hitting the channels. Gallagher hit down the right channel, whilst Dolan far side beats Kakay to the other channel- thankfully the ball wasn’t accurate enough to capitalise.
The other example showing the issues with defensive distances is through opposition teams ‘pinning’ our players.
Blackburn’s second goal. 5v4 in the wide area. Dickie gets drawn over to mark Szmodics. Distance between him and Dunne creates the space for Szmodics to attack from Travis’s ball. 2v2 far side means Gallagher pins Dunne, creates the gap between the CBs to attack the open spaces.
Our structure certainly needs work in terms of distances, and I’ll be giving some further overlapping examples shortly. It does change slightly when defending in the back three we’ve switched too lately but we’ll also need to work on our out-of-possession structure when we have the ball to avoid leaving big spaces for teams to hit us in transition.
I’ll begin with teams targeting the full back areas. Laird and Paal both injured, meant Aaron Drewe came in making a big step up and Kakay moved to an unfamiliar position, so it’s understandable there would be a drop off in quality. Rotherham were up first, with Fosu and Ogbene, two athletic and quick wingers, and they really targeted the wide areas. Blackpool to an extent also did similar with Drewe having trouble and Ainsworth quickly swapping him and Kakay over. The difference between the two is the change of system and pushing them further forward.
In the Rotherham game, most of the attacking threat came through Ogbene (Kakay’s side). Kakay playing at LB as a right footer meant a bigger change in his body position, compared to a left footer his body position is closed off.
Kakay’s body position is closed, facing away from Ogbene unlike a natural left footer. Ball over the top and a touch in front from Ogbene gets past Kakay on his blindside.
Ogbene’s touch takes him away from Kakay.
Gets to the by-line, cuts it back for Hugill which leads to the opening goal.
Another example. Harding clips a ball over the defence. Kakay closed body position again! Ogbene out of shot is the target.
Touch inside takes Ogbene in front of Kakay into the penalty box putting Rotherham into a promising position.
These examples highlight how badly a Kenneth Paal back-up has been needed. Kakay is capable on his natural side, but in those scenarios ideally you play a left footed LB with some pace and mobility. Now, I’m not saying Hamaleinan (who is away on loan anyway) would make an impact, but someone of that profile, in my opinion, would have managed those scenarios better - player profiles do matter!
Now onto the full back defending and something that I have noticed that has been both good and bad (mainly bad) is the way our FBs defend in deeper scenarios. As touched on previously, Ainsworth is big on defensive compactness, distances and forcing play wide. When the ball is in wide areas, the fundamental is the full back should not be positioned outside the vertical line to the opposition player in possession until he passes the ball to the wide man. Now that probably sounds confusing, so I’ll show some examples and hopefully it makes sense.
Ogbene is in possession of the ball. Kakay moves slightly wider for reasons known only to himself, where he was originally in line with Ogbene in possession where he was supposed to be. Now he is no longer in line, and the distance between him (LB) and Dunne (LCB) have increased, Ogbene can now play a vertical pass into Fosu on the turn with a lot of space.
Fosu receives, turns and can drive at our defence. All from Kakay’s slight early movement wide before the ball is released. It opened up space inside not outside like Ainsworth wants.
Within the same game, Drewe finds himself in the same scenario and this is an excellent example of how to do it.
Tight distances with Dickie (RCB). Stands vertical to Odoffin in possession whilst being wary of Ferguson as the runner.
Screens the play wide as the distances were tight and prevented play inside. He’s alert to anticipate the run of Ferguson.
Drewe doesn’t commit, forces Ferguson to the by-line and blocks the cross out for a corner. Had the cross got through- Dickie and Dunne were there close by to cover anything.
Now unfortunately as well as Drewe did there- he was responsible for doing the opposite against Blackpool, which created a knock-on effect and lead to one of their goals.
Drewe jumps early prior to Husband playing the ball- option for Blackpool is inside our shape rather than out. What he should have done is stay in Husband’s line, block off the inside and then trigger his jump if CJ Hamilton received by the touchline (in a less risky area).
Yates then receives and plays it to Morgan Rogers. Hamilton follows up the combination by making a run beyond to add depth. At this point - before receiving the pass - Drewe is already wrong side.
Drewe continues to be wrong side, Hamilton wins the duel in the box and is able to find the run of the far side WB Lyons who scores to make it 2-0.
The goal as a whole wasn’t just the initial error from Drewe, he also was wrong side to Hamilton when Blackpool had possession. It goes to show how big the small details have on your defensive structure. Particularly when the wide players in recent games have been opposition team’s biggest threats with their pace and athleticism- our FBs need to be switched on to apply the defensive basics to maintain a good structure without the ball.
Ainsworth I’m sure will be particularly drilling the out of possession work over the international break- particularly with the number of avoidable goals we’ve conceded already. The proof no doubt will be in the final run of games.
Links >>> More like this at Dan’s SubStack >>> What have we learned so far? >>> QPR’s attacking set pieces >>> Struggling to break down defences >>> Positive changes v Sheff Utd
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